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Iran’s opposition after Montazeri

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 At first glance, the death of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri this week can be considered as a blow to Iran’s nascent opposition movement. He was an outspoken religious leader who was once Ayatollah Khomeini’s closest associate and possible successor. But the two men parted ways when Montazeri enunciated his objection to the concept of uncontested supreme jurist leadership, or wilayat al-faqih. Montazeri fell from grace and spent many years under house arrest in the holy city of Qom.

 

On the other hand, his funeral last Monday, which was attended by tens of thousands of mourners, among them top political leaders of Iran’s opposition movement, proved without doubt that the Islamic Republic is facing one of the most crucial internal challenges since its birth in 1979.

 

The opposition is real enough and the issues that the late Montazeri and former presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have raised are shared by a growing number of ordinary Iranians.

 

The funeral provided the opposition with the opportunity to demonstrate its presence in spite of a government crackdown. Mourners came from all over the country to show solidarity and sympathy. But the overall message was clear: The struggle to change things in Iran continues in earnest.

 

In death Montazeri had given the opposition a reason to come together and reiterate their challenge of the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but more importantly, perhaps, to declare their rejection of the hegemony of the clergy led by Ayatollah Khameini, the country’s supreme jurist and spiritual leader.

 

It remains a risky challenge. The government had shown that it will not back down or deal lightly with “enemies of the revolution.” The opposition relies mostly on middle-class support in Tehran and other suburban areas, while the religious establishment remains strong in the countryside and can always count on the Basij, a paramilitary militia loyal to Khameini, and the Revolutionary Guards.

 

Historically, Iran’s middle class had played a central role in challenging the power of the Shah, and in triggering demonstrations and civil defiance which culminated in the revolution that finally brought him down. But challenging the power of the Supreme Leader is something else. Montazeri, as a senior cleric, could do it, but now that he’s gone the task before the likes of Mousavi and Karroubi just got tougher.

 

No doubt Ahmadinejad, who won last June’s controversial presidential elections, will be happy for the opposition’s loss. He still enjoys the backing of Khameini but he also knows that the opposition will simply not go away. Economic challenges facing his country have made it easier for the opposition to attract sympathizers. Iran remains largely isolated and is struggling to fend off more sanctions by the West over its refusal to compromise on its nuclear program.

 

It is also a youthful country, with over 60 percent of its 70 million citizens under the age of 30. It is these young people who are slowly changing the balance of power. Having fought a bloody and costly eight-year war against Iraq in the 1980s, many Iranians want to see their country turning a corner and moving into the 21st century. Post-election demonstrations, protesting the victory of Ahmadinejad, underlined the growing power of Iran’s young and outward looking population.

 

The opposition can still count on the backing of other influential leaders within the establishment. In the early 1990s President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani launched important reforms to enliven the country’s ailing economy by favoring pro-business policies. He stopped short of challenging the clergical authority. He was succeeded in 1997 by President Mohammad Khatami, described as moderate reformist, who repaired Iran’s relations with the EU, Asian and Arab states, while advocating freedom of expression and democratic values. His policies were criticized by the religious establishment and as result he was unable to carry out his reformist program.

 

Ahmadinejad’s victory in the 2005 elections was also a triumph for the conservative forces who had viewed with suspicion the presidencies of Khatemi and Rafsanjani. Political reforms could only weaken the grip of Khameini and refute the dogma of wilayat al-faqih.  Ahmadinejad carried out the vision which the religious establishment favored; a stronger anti-West Iran with a bigger regional role.

 

Since 2005 Ahmadinejad, who was elected on a populist platform that promised to help the poor and launch social projects, has worked to fulfill that conservative vision. As a result most of the country’s resources were directed to beef up the military, upgrade the objectives of the nuclear program and increase the Islamic Republic’s leverage in Iraq, the Gulf, Lebanon and Palestine, among others.

 

But there was a hefty price tag to such endeavors. As billions of dollars were diverted from essential services and new projects, the economy suffered. In 2008 it was estimated that unemployment had reached 9.6 percent, rising to 20.3 percent among people under the age of 24, while inflation was nearly 29 percent.

 

Growing discontent helped boost the ambitions of reformist figures such as Mousavi, a former prime minister, and Karroubi, a moderate cleric. Both ran in the June elections, whose results they contest until today. As opposition followers and pro-government supporters clashed, Khameini stood firm behind his protégé.

 

It is unlikely that the opposition will be able to force the government and the religious establishment to yield concessions soon. But the opposition has become a reality in modern Iranian politics. It will have to tread carefully though as Iran prepares for a possible showdown with the West in the coming weeks over the nuclear issue. One thing the government will try to do is to tarnish the reputation of opposition leaders by linking them to enemies of the republic. Exporting a dire internal crisis is one way for Ahmadinejad to turn things around against his foes.

 

Meanwhile, the opposition can count on the worsening economic conditions and the fact that a younger population will never stop calling for reforms and a larger say in its future.

 

Osama Al Sharif is a veteran journalist and political commentator based in Jordan.